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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, corporations spend on average nearly thirty-five bil-
lion dollars on sports-related marketing, ranging from stadium 
naming rights and promotional sponsorships, to commercials and 
endorsement deals.1 In mining through some of the potential legal 
traps, corporate advertisers understand that utilizing the name, im-
age, or likeness of athletes or celebrities in marketing and promo-
tional campaigns requires some form of consent and compensation. 
Corporations hire lawyers for “advertising clearance”: to ensure 
that slogans, logos, and images are available for use, and that video 
and music in audio-visual recordings are otherwise licensed. The 
concept of getting permission or authorization is relatively straight-
forward. However, gray areas remain. 
For example, what if an assemblage of athletes’ names, images, 
and biographical information are incorporated in a social media 
campaign—developed and promoted by a single company—that 
merely aggregates public information? Or what if a company pro-
duces a print advertisement seeking solely to congratulate an ath-
lete for a career achievement? These questions lie at the core of 
two recent cases2 in which courts have been challenged to deter-
mine where brand, or “image advertising,” resides at the nexus of 
the First Amendment, commercial speech, and the laws governing 
                                                                                                                            
1 By way of example, Adidas recently signed National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) player James Harden to a $200 million shoe deal. Nike signed an eight-year 
partnership with the NBA worth roughly $1 billion that begins with the 2017–2018 
season. See Darren Heitner, What a 13-Year, $200 Million Deal Means to James Harden 
and Adidas, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darren
heitner/2015/08/13/what-a-13-year-200-million-deal-means-to-james-harden-and-
adidas/ [https://perma.cc/KW83-YS88]. 
2 This Article examines two cases: Spitz v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. BC 
483475, 2013 WL 6816181 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013), and Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 
Inc. (Jordan I), 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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the right of publicity.3 More specifically, the courts in these cases 
analyzed whether the use of athletes’ likeness within these particu-
lar advertising contexts amounted to noncommercial speech (thus 
deserving of a higher degree of First Amendment free speech pro-
tection), or conversely, commercial speech (thus deserving of a 
lesser degree of First Amendment protection). 
The plaintiffs in these cases are two of the most legendary ath-
letes of our time. In Spitz v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,4 
iconic Olympic swimmer Mark Spitz and numerous other notable 
Olympians sued Samsung over a Samsung-sponsored Facebook 
app5 that incorporated names, images, and biographical informa-
tion of over 10,000 current and former Olympic athletes.6 While 
acknowledging that Samsung’s sponsorship of the Olympic Ge-
nome Project Facebook app was intended to enhance its brand im-
age, the court, in ruling for the defendants,7 classified Samsung’s 
activity as noncommercial speech. In its ruling, the court relied 
heavily on the second case this Article addresses: Jordan v. Jewel 
Food Stores (Jordan I).8 
In Jordan I, Chicago-based drugstore chain Jewel-Osco ran a 
print advertisement in a national sports publication, congratulating 
Bulls’ legend Michael Jordan on his enshrinement in the Basketball 
Hall of Fame.9 The advertisement mentioned Jordan’s name and 
featured an image of a pair of sneakers with the number “23,” and 
identified the drugstore by its own name, stylized logo, and slogan. 
                                                                                                                            
3 Although these two cases involve athletes, the issues apply as equally to non-sport 
celebrities. For this reason, the terms “athletes” and “celebrities” are used 
interchangeably throughout this Article. 
4 Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *1. Team Epic, the promotion agency that developed and 
managed Samsung’s Genome Project, was also named in the lawsuit and took the lead in 
defending it. 
5 An “app,” shorthand for “application,” is a software program, designed for a 
particular purpose, for a computer or other operating system. See Press Release, 
American Dialect Society, “App” 2010 Word of Year, as Voted by American Dialect 
Society (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.americandialect.org/American-Dialect-Society-2010-
Word-of-the-Year-press-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XKS-X4NJ]. 
6 Chuck Squatriglia, Olympians Sue Samsung Over Facebook App, WIRED (Apr. 26, 
2012, 4:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/04/olympians-sue-samsung/ [https://perma
.cc/FZH5-FMQ6]. 
7 The disposition of this case was based on an anti-SLAPP motion. See infra Part III. 
8 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
9 Id. at 1104. 
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Despite its obvious reference to Jordan’s identity, the district court 
deemed the speech a congratulatory message, and noncommercial 
in nature. 
The Spitz and Jordan I decisions confirmed that at least in 
some contexts—here, the aggregation of public information and 
congratulatory messaging—companies could legally incorporate 
athlete names and other indicia of identity in advertising campaigns 
that, while promoting the corporation itself, were not designed to 
sell a specific product or service.10 Such advertising, despite its in-
clusion of athletes’ indicia, was deemed noncommercial and hence 
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.11 
This proposition, however, took a precedent-setting U-turn in 
February 2014, when the Seventh Circuit for the U.S. Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court’s decision in Jordan I.12 In Jor-
dan II, the Seventh Circuit held that although Jewel-Osco’s congra-
tulatory advertisement did not promote or sell a specific product or 
service, its purpose as “image advertising” was enough to classify 
the advertisement as commercial speech, and thus eliminate Jewel-
Osco’s First Amendment noncommercial speech defense.13 As a 
result, Jordan was given the green light to resume pursuing his 
right of publicity claim under Illinois statutory law,14 in which he 
sought five million dollars in damages.15 Although the parties ulti-
mately settled in November 201516 and the facts of Spitz and Jor-
                                                                                                                            
10 Id. at 1105. 
11 Id. 
12 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores (Jordan II), 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014); see Darren 
Rovell, Jordan Ruling Could Set Precedent, ESPN (Feb. 20, 2014, 5:56 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/10491664/michael-jordan-wins-appeal-
endorsement-case-jewel-food-stores [https://perma.cc/4UMK-5ZYV]. 
13 Jordan II, 743 F.3d at 512. 
14 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1 to 60 (2015). 
15 Rovell, supra note 12. 
16 See Jon Seidel, Michael Jordan Settles with Jewel, Dominick’s, CHI. SUN TIMES (Nov. 
22, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/7/71/1122975/grocery-chain-
says-michael-jordan-settling-jewel-dominicks [https://perma.cc/FE4Z-KUL9]. In 
addition to suing Jewel Food, Jordan also sued Dominick’s Finer Foods in response to its 
congratulatory advertisement in the same Sports Illustrated commemorative issue. Jordan 
v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 115 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The Dominick’s ad 
stated, “Congratulations Michael Jordan: You Are a Cut Above.” Id. at 954. The bottom 
quarter of the ad, however, included a picture of a Rancher’s Reserve steak and a two 
dollar coupon toward the purchase of a steak at any Dominick’s location. Id. As with his 
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dan are distinguishable, these two cases have added a new and ar-
guably conflicting dimension to the ongoing tension between the 
First Amendment freedoms of speech and expression and the right 
of publicity. 
Part I of this Article begins by discussing the historical evolu-
tion of right of publicity law, from baseball cards to video games, 
followed by an examination of issues at the nexus of the right of 
publicity, trademark law, and the First Amendment. In Part II, we 
discuss the origins and evolution of the commercial speech doc-
trine, and the ongoing challenge in distinguishing non-commercial 
from commercial speech. In Part III, we examine the Spitz case in 
detail, including the rationale and reliance on the district court opi-
nion in Jordan I. In Part IV, we discuss the Seventh Circuit’s opi-
nion in Jordan II, which rebukes the rationale in Spitz through its 
expansion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bolger test.17 Specifically, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the failure to reference a specific 
product in the commercial-speech analysis “is far from dispositive, 
especially where ‘image’ or brand advertising rather than product 
advertising is concerned.”18 In Part V we discuss the legal and 
practical implications of Spitz and Jordan II, especially if the Se-
venth Circuit’s analysis of what constitutes commercial speech 
should be adopted by other jurisdictions. Ultimately, we conclude 
that the Seventh Circuit, while arguably broadening the scope of 
publicity rights through its re-interpretation of the Bolger test, non-
                                                                                                                            
claim against Jewel Food, Jordan alleged violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act. 
See id. On summary judgment, the court orally ruled in favor of Jordan and left for a jury 
to decide damages. Id. Interestingly, the court in Jordan I hinted that, when comparing 
the Jewel Food and Dominick’s ads, “[I]f somebody were to view one of the pages as an 
advertisement, it would be the Dominick’s page.” Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. The 
court’s prediction came true when, in August 2015, a jury awarded Jordan an $8.9 million 
judgment against Dominick’s. Kim Janssen, Jordan Says “It Was Never About the Money” 
After $8.9M Jury Award, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2015, 9:46 PM), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/business/ct-michael-jordan-dominicks-case-0822-biz-20150821-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/TW4F-PFQU]. In addition to settling with Jewel Food in November 
2015, Jordan also settled the case with Dominick’s, which was considering an appeal of 
the jury verdict. See Tony Briscoe, Michael Jordan Reaches Settlement with Jewel, 
Dominick’s, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/ct-michael-jordan-jewel-dominicks-settlement-met-20151122-
story.html [https://perma.cc/YU9F-J3DW]. 
17 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
18 Jordan II, 743 F.3d at 519. 
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etheless shines a brighter light and sheds important guidance for 
companies seeking to use celebrity names and likeness in image ad-
vertising campaigns generally, and congratulatory ads in particular. 
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A. The Right of Publicity as a Right of Privacy 
The jurisprudence regarding the right of publicity grew initially 
out of the right of privacy over a century ago. The right of privacy’s 
fundamental principle was, in essence, the right “to be let alone.”19 
In their famous law review article in 1890, Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis and scholar Charles Warren proposed that “the law 
must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of por-
traits of private persons.”20 According to Supreme Court analysis 
of their text, “[T]he central thesis of the root article by Warren and 
Brandeis . . . was that the press was overstepping its prerogatives 
by publishing essentially private information and that there should 
be a remedy for the alleged abuses.”21 Lamenting the press for in-
vading the private sphere, “Warren and Brandeis advocated right 
of privacy to forbid the publication of idle gossip and restore ‘pro-
priety and dignity’ to the press.”22 The law, they asserted, pro-
tected the right of privacy to include the right of one’s “inviolate 
personality”23 as against the world: 
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so pro-
tected, whatever their exact nature, are not rights 
arising from contract or from special trust, but are 
rights as against the world; and, as above stated, the 
principle which has been applied to protect these 
rights is in reality not the principle of private prop-
erty, unless that word be used in an extended and 
                                                                                                                            
19 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). 
20 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890) (emphasis added). 
21 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975). 
22 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1020 (5th ed. 2010) (internal citation 
omitted). 
23 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 205. 
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unusual sense. The principle which protects per-
sonal writings and any other productions of the in-
tellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and 
the law has no new principle to formulate when it 
extends this protection to the personal appearance, 
sayings, acts, and to personal relations, domestic or 
otherwise.24 
In 1960, noted scholar William L. Prosser expanded on the 
right “to be let alone” privacy principle by identifying four privacy 
torts,25 and his conceptualization was incorporated nearly verbatim 
into the Second Restatement.26 Prosser’s fourth privacy tort—
appropriation of another’s name or likeness—is the principle be-
hind what is now known as a right of publicity.27 
B. The Right of Publicity as a Right to Control 
Leaving the historical application of the “privacy” theory of 
the right of publicity, courts and scholars began developing a more 
expansive definition. As Professor Melville B. Nimmer predicted, 
what the celebrity really wants is not necessarily protection against 
an unreasonable intrusion of privacy, but a fundamental right to 
control his or her commercial value.28 “[A]lthough the well known 
personality does not wish to hide his light under a bushel of priva-
cy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph and likeness 
reproduced and publicized without his consent or without remune-
ration to him.”29 Now, courts in most jurisdictions uniformly hold 
                                                                                                                            
24 Id. at 213. 
25 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). These included: (1) 
unreasonable intrusion upon another’s seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) 
false light invasion of privacy; and (4) appropriation of another’s name or likeness. Id. 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1976). 
27 See id.; Prosser, supra note 25, at 389. 
28 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 28:4 (4th ed. 2015) (quoting Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203–04 (1954)). 
29 See id.; see also Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct. 
1968) (“What such a [public] figure really seeks is a type of relief which will enable him to 
garner financial benefits from the pecuniary value which attaches to his name and 
picture.”). 
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that the right of publicity should be considered as a free standing 
right independent from the right of privacy.30 
Essentially, the right of publicity is a private cause of action un-
der common or state law regarding the right of an individual to con-
trol the commercial use of his or her identity.31 There is no federal 
law applying the right of publicity.32 The principle is rooted in the 
cognizable property interest of a person’s right against unautho-
rized commercial uses of his or her name or likeness.33 The very 
core of the majority rule’s application of the right of publicity is 
best articulated by trademark law’s most renowned expert, J. 
Thomas McCarthy: 
The right of publicity is the inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or 
her identity. This legal right is infringed by unper-
mitted use which will likely damage the commercial 
value of this inherent right of human identity and 
which is not immunized by principles of free speech 
and free press. Infringement of the right of publicity 
is a commercial tort, and a form of unfair competi-
tion. The right of publicity is property, and is prop-
erly categorized as a form of intellectual property.34 
McCarthy’s more expansive definition goes beyond just the 
right “to be let alone” (i.e., the right of privacy). He makes the 
right of publicity an “inherent right,” which is likely more expan-
sive than Brandeis, Warren, or even Prosser would have ever in-
tended. 
Thus, the right of publicity has evolved first from being “let 
alone,” to the right to control, and finally, to not being commercial-
ly exploited. “Fundamentally, the right of publicity ‘is the inherent 
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or 
                                                                                                                            
30 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
32 For one of numerous articles that have advocated for passage of a federal right of 
publicity statute, see Risa J. Weaver, Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a 
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2010). 
33 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
34 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28:1. 
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her identity’”35 and to prevent against economic exploitation.36 As 
the entertainment and sports industries have grown, so too has case 
law on the rights of publicity. This right of publicity has developed 
in response to the “rise of mass advertising and the growing recog-
nition that a celebrity’s imprimatur on a product or even associa-
tion of a product with a celebrity’s persona enhances its appeal to 
consumers.”37 Proving a right of publicity claim varies from state to 
state, but in general a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) one’s 
name, likeness or image, (2) was misappropriated without permis-
sion, and (3) which likely caused harm to the commercial value of 
that person.38 
C. State Right of Publicity Statutes 
A right of publicity claim is a state-driven cause of action.39 A 
plaintiff who sues based on a right of publicity claim is cognizable 
by state statutory law or common law. Judge Jerome Frank, in a 
1953 case in the Second Circuit, coined the term “right of publici-
ty,”40 which prompted states to begin, as early as the 1970s, to 
enact statutes recognizing the right of publicity.41 As of April 2016, 
thirty-two states now recognize a right of publicity42: twenty-one of 
which recognize it under common law, and eleven of which have 
codified it by state statute.43 Some states, like California, recognize 
both a statutory and common law right of publicity.44 
                                                                                                                            
35 Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28:1); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28:7 (noting 
that to trigger infringement of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must be “identifiable” 
from defendant’s unauthorized use). 
36 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 22 (“The modern right of publicity 
reflects two distinct rationales—one grounded in privacy and the other in economic 
exploitation.”). 
37 Id. 
38 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28:7. 
39 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:1 (2d ed. 
2015). 
40 Id. § 1:26 (describing the effect of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1951) on the development of the right of publicity). 
41 Id. § 1:26 n.5 (listing states that enacted statutes “codifying to varying extents the 
rights of privacy and publicity”). 
42 Id. § 6:3. 
43 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 22. 
44 See Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“California law recognizes both a statutory and common law right of publicity.”). 
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Uniformly, the right of publicity under these state laws is 
rooted in the cognizable property interest of a person’s right 
against unauthorized commercial uses of his or her name, image, or 
likeness.45 Some state statutes also recognize a right of publicity 
even to a private citizen. For example, in Georgia, the right of pub-
licity encompasses the “rights of private citizens, as well as enter-
tainers, not to have their names and photographs used for the fi-
nancial gain of the user without their consent, where such use is 
not authorized as an exercise of freedom of the press.”46 Although 
the states offer similar levels of protections to living persons, right 
of publicity protections for deceased celebrities vary.47 
D. Evolution of Right of Publicity Case Law 
Jurisprudence on right of publicity has evolved down two paths: 
right of publicity in context of commercial advertising and right of 
publicity in the context of expressive works.48 The earliest case ac-
knowledging the “right of publicity” was Haelan Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. in 1953.49 In Haelan, the plaintiff had 
                                                                                                                            
45 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
46 Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 
S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982)). 
47 For example, California’s right of publicity statute provides in part that: 
Any person who uses a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, 
without prior consent from the [decedent’s successor or successors in 
interest], shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or 
persons injured as a result thereof. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a) (2002). Other states such as New York, however, do not 
recognize a right of publicity post-mortem. See Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Elec. 
Hendrix, LLC, No. C07–0338 TSZ, 2008 WL 3243896, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 
2008) (holding that assignee of the estate of deceased rock musician Jimi Hendrix could 
own trademarks in his name and image for various goods and services even though there 
was no right of publicity because Hendrix died domiciled in New York, which did not 
recognize a post-mortem right of publicity) (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (2015)). 
48 The focus within this Article is on the right of publicity in context of commercial 
advertising. 
49 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28:4 (“Judge Jerome Frank in 
1953 was the first to coin the term ‘right of publicity.’”). While as early as 1891 the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized a person’s right to the use of his or her own name, it was not 
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negotiated exclusive licenses from several Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”) players authorizing the use of their images on baseball 
cards that were included with packs of gum.50 Defendant Topps, a 
rival company, sold its own gum with photographs of these same 
players.51 Haelan argued that the defendant had infringed upon 
Haelan’s exclusive right to employ the players’ pictures, even 
though the defendant knew of Haelan’s exclusive right of con-
tract.52 Although ruling that New York’s privacy law statute did 
not extend to such uses, the court ruled that “a man has a right in 
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the ex-
clusive privilege of publishing the picture, and that such a grant 
may validly be made ‘in gross’” under New York common law.53 
In resolving the dispute, the court created a new right, the right of 
publicity, to be used when celebrities, entertainers, and public fig-
ures claimed misappropriation or infringement of their privacy.54 
The Haelan court recognized that while celebrities may not suffer a 
high level of emotional harm when their identities are misappro-
priated, celebrities nevertheless need some type of protection from 
such activities.55 Right of publicity law continued to evolve and 
broaden in scope through a string of cases involving athletes, in-
cluding MLB player Art Shamsky,56 auto racer Lothar Motschen-
bacher,57 and basketball legend Kareem Abdul-Jabbar.58 However, 
                                                                                                                            
coined or established as a “right of publicity.” See Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 
540, 543 (1891) (holding that a person has a right to use his or her own name, and that it, 
by itself, is not transferable but conceded that a name is transferable when it accompanies 
the goodwill of a firm or product when sold). 
50 Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 868. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 167 Misc. 2d 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that (1) sale 
of clothing without permission of individual players violated players’ statutory right of 
publicity; and (2) uniform player’s contract entered into by team members, permitting 
their pictures to be taken and used for publicity purposes, did not authorize club to use 
the team photo in contravention of their respective rights to publicity). 
57 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(holding that a photograph depicting distinctive aspects of a race car driver’s car was an 
actionable misappropriation of the driver’s identity under California law). 
58 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). The Abdul-Jabbar 
court held that “by using Alcindor’s record to make a claim for its car . . . GMC has 
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recent high profile cases involving the emergence of fantasy gaming 
evinced a balancing of the right of publicity with the First Amend-
ment and the fair use exception.59 
E. EA Sports Cases Broaden Scope of Right of Publicity 
Three recent cases involving former college athletes—Rutgers 
football player Ryan Hart60 and Arizona State quarterback Sam 
Keller61 against Electronic Arts (“EA”), and former UCLA bas-
ketball player Ed O’Bannon against the National Collegiate Athlet-
ic Association (“NCAA”)62—have arguably served to further ex-
pand the right of publicity beyond its originally intended scope.63 In 
2009, Hart sued EA64 in federal court in New Jersey, asserting that 
                                                                                                                            
arguably attempted to ‘appropriate the cachet of one product for another.’” Id. at 413 
(quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992)). Additionally, the “right of publicity protects celebrities from appropriations of 
their identity not strictly definable as ‘name or picture.’” Id. at 415 (quoting 
Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827). 
59 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). The court held that “CBC’s First Amendment rights 
in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the players’ rights of publicity.” Id.; see 
also CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 
417 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding that the First Amendment protects use of players’ names, 
statistics, and other information in fantasy football games). 
60 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (Hart I), 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d, 717 F.3d 
141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
61 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
62 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
Although this case involved right of publicity claims, it was decided on antitrust grounds 
and thus not on point for our discussion here. In O’Bannon, co-defendants Electronic 
Arts (“EA”) and the Collegiate Licensing Corporation settled with the plaintiffs for forty 
million dollars in 2014. See Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M, ESPN 
(May 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-
reach-40-million-settlement-ea-sports-ncaa-licensing-arm [https://perma.cc/C6PJ-
VLSG]. 
63 Legal scholars have been highly critical of the courts’ arguable expansion of publicity 
rights at the expense of First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Mark Conrad, A New First 
Amendment Goal Line Defense—Stopping the Right of Publicity Offense, 40 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 743 (2014); Martin H. Redish and Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1444 
(2015) (arguing that “the courts’ willingness to incorporate established precepts of 
commercial speech protection into their right of publicity calculus is long overdue”). 
64 EA Sports, a division of EA, is the producer of the annual NCAA Football series of 
video games, which allow users to control avatars representing college football players as 
those avatars participate in simulated games. In EA Sports’ NCAA Football video game, 
the game features the ability to replicate each school’s entire team as accurately as 
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EA had used his image and likeness in its NCAA football video 
game (and in advertising promotions).65 On summary judgment, 
the court ruled in favor of EA, noting that Hart’s “identity” was 
limited to his likeness and biographical information.66 Further, the 
court found that the use of Hart’s likeness was sufficiently trans-
formative to warrant First Amendment protection and that EA’s 
First Amendment interests outweighed Hart’s right of publicity in 
his likeness.67 Interesting to this case study, the court found that 
the video game itself did not constitute commercial speech due, in 
large part, to the nature of the use of the image at the time of its 
purchase.68 The court noted that Hart’s image was not used in any 
advertisement in promoting the video game and that his image was 
only accessible after the commercial transaction was already com-
plete; a buyer had to proactively play the game and select use of the 
Hart avatar, and even then, the buyer had the ability to utilize the 
artistic and creative aspects developed by EA to manipulate the 
player avatars such as Hart.69 
EA’s victory was, however, short-lived. In May 2013, the Third 
Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision.70 After discussing the 
various tests previously established to determine right of publicity 
claims—the “transformative use” test, the “predominant use 
test,” and the “relatedness” or so-called Rogers Test71—the court, 
                                                                                                                            
possible. Every real football player on each team included in the game has a corresponding 
avatar in the game with the player’s actual jersey number and virtually identical height, 
weight, build, skin tone, hair color, and home state. See generally EA SPORTS, 
https://www.easports.com [https://perma.cc/DP9F-BNJU] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
65 Hart I, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
66 Id. at 793–94. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 770. 
69 Id. 
To be clear, it is not the user’s alteration of Hart’s image that is 
critical. What matters for my analysis of EA’s First Amendment right 
is that EA created the mechanism by which the virtual player may be 
altered, as well as the multiple permutations available for each virtual 
player image. Since the game permits the user to alter the virtual 
player’s physical characteristics, including the player’s height, 
weight, hairstyle, face shape, body size, muscle size, and complexion. 
Id. at 785. 
70 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (Hart II), 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
71 See id. It is not within the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the elements and 
application of these various tests that jurisdictions have adopted to balance the right of 
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applying the transformative test, held that EA did indeed violate 
the plaintiff’s right of publicity.72 The Ninth Circuit held similarly 
in Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,73 finding Keller to be “materially 
identical” to Hart II.74 The Keller court ruled that EA’s use of Kel-
ler’s image was not sufficiently transformative for two reasons. 
First, Keller and his videogame counterpart shared enough charac-
teristics to be virtually identical.75 Second, EA had placed Keller’s 
videogame character in the precise setting that the real Sam Keller 
derived his fame: the football field.76 The court concluded that EA 
could not prove as a matter of law that its use of Keller’s likeness 
was permissible based on the transformative use defense.77 Thus, 
both the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit agreed that EA’s use of 
the plaintiffs’ identities in NCAA football video games was not suf-
ficiently transformative to receive First Amendment protection.78 
Even more recently, in January 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision in Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. to deny 
EA’s motion to strike the complaint brought by former profession-
al football players.79 Although this recent spate of right of publicity 
                                                                                                                            
publicity with First Amendment concerns. For articles detailing each of these tests, see 
John Grady, Steve McKelvey & Annie Clement, A New “Twist” for “The Home Run 
Guys”: An Analysis of the Right of Publicity Versus Parody, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, no. 
2, 2005, at 267, and Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right 
of Publicity–Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471 (2003) (proposing, for the 
first time, the “predominant use” test, subsequently adopted by the Missouri court in 
Doe v. TCI Communication, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1577 (Ct. App. July 23, 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 76 (2004)). 
72 The Third Circuit reasoned that Hart’s real world likeness and player statistics used 
by the game were the foundation for its realistic gameplay, therefore, EA had not 
sufficiently transformed Hart’s likeness enough to be protected under the First 
Amendment. See Hart II, 717 F.3d at 168–70. 
73 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
74 Id. at 1278. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). Similar to the complaints in 
the NCAA Football video game cases, the plaintiffs allege that EA created over 6,000 
accurate unauthorized likenesses of former players who appeared on more than 100 
historic teams in Madden NFL games. Id. at 1176. The plaintiffs asserted claims for right 
of publicity, conversion, trespass to chattels, and unjust enrichment. EA moved to strike 
the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) under 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Id. The district court denied EA’s motion on the 
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cases illustrates the arguable over-breadth of the right of publicity 
within expressive works,80 ultimately our focus here turns to the 
use of athlete persona in the context of commercial advertising. 
F. The Nexus of Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
The way a company uses an athlete’s publicity in commerce, 
even without permission, can enable certain defenses, one of which 
is afforded by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression. Pursuant to the First Amend-
ment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”81 
                                                                                                                            
grounds that the plaintiffs established a reasonable probability they would prevail on their 
claims. Id. at 1177. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit struck EA’s motion because they were 
unable to show that Madden NFL should be afforded First Amendment protection under 
any one of the five affirmative defenses they claimed. Id. at 1181. 
80 See Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, and Identity: The Scope and 
Purpose of the Right of Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (2014). 
Despite the expansion of the right of publicity doctrine, some courts have recently held 
the line in cases involving the use of game footage and photos. See Dryer v. Nat’l Football 
League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (D. Minn. 2014). In Dryer, a group of retired NFL players 
who chose to opt out of a previous class action settlement with the NFL filed a lawsuit 
claiming that the NFL’s use of video footage of players in television productions violated 
their publicity rights, caused consumer confusion, and unjustly enriched the league. Id. at 
1186. In October 2014, the District Court of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the 
NFL, holding that the television productions recounting of professional football games 
were not commercial speech, and thus were fully protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
at 1193. Specifically, the court held that although the NFL had an economic interest in 
creating the productions, the league did not pay television networks to broadcast the 
productions, the productions used the players’ footage merely because the games could 
not be described visually any other way, and the productions did not reference a separate 
product or service. Id.; see also Marshall v. ESPN Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 815 (M.D. Tenn. 
2015) (dismissing a lawsuit brought by several University of Tennessee football players 
against numerous media and broadcasting companies arguing that their rights of publicity 
have been infringed by broadcasters, and holding that the players in sporting events do 
not have publicity rights under common law in Tennessee, and moreover, that the 
plaintiffs failed to show that they had been deprived of any fundamental right). 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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The goal of the First Amendment is to secure the common 
good through the “free exchange of ideas.”82 As such, public dis-
course regarding topics like politics, religion, and other matters of 
opinion are considered noncommercial and, therefore, are afforded 
a certain level of constitutional protection. This level of scrutiny 
varies by the content of the speech. Content-based restrictions on 
speech are subject to a high bar of scrutiny and are only valid if the 
speech is necessary and tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.83 Conversely, content-neutral restrictions are subject to an in-
termediate tier of scrutiny. Here, courts must balance governmen-
tal interests against the speaker’s right to free expression.84 The 
courts will rule “in favor of the government if its interests are im-
portant or substantial and do not burden the exercise of protected 
speech beyond what is necessary for their achievement.”85 Fur-
thermore, the courts must uphold economic regulations, especially 
those that disclose noncontroversial information, if they are related 
to legitimate government interests within reason and are not “un-
justified or unduly burdensome.”86 There are other types of speech 
that receive no constitutional protection.87 Clearly, the First 
Amendment will preempt publicity rights when persona is used in 
                                                                                                                            
82 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)). 
83 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987). 
84 See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804–05 
(1984) (inquiring whether the government interest is sufficiently substantial to justify its 
content-neutral restriction). 
85 See Lucien J. Dhooge, The First Amendment and Disclosure Regulations: Compelled 
Speech or Corporate Opportunism, AM. BUS. L.J. 599, 605 (2014) (citing Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968)). 
86 See id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); 
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
87 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–47 (1974) (defamation of private 
individuals); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (inflammatory speech directed at inciting, and likely 
incite, imminent lawless action); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–80 (1964) 
(defamation of public officials or figures where the publisher knew the statement was false 
or acted with reckless disregard or its truth or falsity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942) (use of words in a public place likely to cause a breach of the 
peace). 
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the context of news reporting, commentary, entertainment, or 
works of fiction and nonfiction.88 The challenge comes when the 
use of persona falls within the “for purposes of trade” provision of 
the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition.89 
Typically, an unauthorized use of a person’s identity will fall 
within one of two categories: the challenged use is either “commu-
nicative” or “commercial.” A communicative use is one in which 
the policy of free speech predominates over the right of the person 
to his identity.90 Conversely, a “commercial” use of one’s publici-
ty is much more likely to infringe upon the right of publicity.91 
However, this distinction continues to provide a fertile ground for 
legal wrangling. Recent legal decisions and commentary document 
the ongoing the tension between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.92 Within the sport context, relatively recent examples 
include two decisions involving online fantasy sports providers. In 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media L.P.,93 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court 
ruling that MLB players have rights of publicity in their names and 
performance statistics; however, the court also held that those 
                                                                                                                            
88 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 28.6. 
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). The 
Restatement clarifies “for purposes of trade” as a use in advertising the user’s goods or 
services, or on merchandise marketed by the user, or . . . in connection with services 
rendered by the user. Id. § 47. 
90 See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
a feature in a magazine using the name and photo of actor Dustin Hoffman was an 
entertainment story and not a misappropriation). 
91 See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting car 
manufacturer’s First Amendment defense that its use of Alcindor’s name was only 
“incidental” to conveying newsworthy sports information: “While Lew Alcindor’s 
basketball record may be said to be ‘newsworthy,’ its use is not automatically privileged. 
GMC used the information in the context of an automobile advertisement, not in a news 
or sports account.”). 
92 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 904 
(2004) (arguing that courts and legislatures have created a property-based right of 
publicity jurisprudence that goes beyond its original goals and encroaches on the 
traditional First Amendment guarantees afforded artistic and creative speech); see also 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 
329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. Sup Ct. 2003). 
93 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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names and performance statistics were within the public domain 
and hence CBC’s online fantasy game was protected under the 
First Amendment.94 In a case involving football fantasy gaming, 
CBS Interactive v. National Football League Players Association95 a 
Minnesota district court ruled in favor of CBS Interactive on essen-
tially the same grounds as the Eighth Circuit in CBC.96 In short, 
the courts have yet to develop a consistent approach in how to bal-
ance the right of publicity with First Amendment freedoms, a sce-
nario made all the more challenging given the confusion that sur-
rounds how we should define what constitutes commercial 
speech.97 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “COMMERCIAL SPEECH” 
DOCTRINE 
An examination of the commercial speech doctrine has histori-
cally encompassed two lines of inquiry. First, whether commercial 
speech is in fact subject to constitutional protection. The second 
line of inquiry—and continued source of confusion—is how com-
mercial speech should be defined. In order to best understand the 
implications of the Spitz and Jordan cases, it is important to first 
understand the history and evolution of the commercial speech 
doctrine. 
The notion of commercial speech emanates from the free 
speech provisions founded in the First Amendment.98 The opera-
                                                                                                                            
94 Id. at 823. 
95 CBS Interactive v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 
2009). 
96 Id. at 417–18. 
97 See infra Part III. 
98 See Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analytical 
Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 127 (Spring 2007). “There is . . . general 
consensus that the First Amendment’s principal aim was to protect political 
deliberations . . . .” Id. at 137. 
98 Dhooge, supra note 85, at 606 (citing Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980) (concluding that “[c]ommerical expression not 
only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers 
the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information”)); see also Va. 
State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763, 765 
(1976) (determining that a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
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tive language of the First Amendment follows: “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”99 Despite the 
fact that the text only directly refers to Congress, “the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes the freedom of speech provision applicable to 
state and local governments.”100 Accordingly, this extension of 
First Amendment protection allows for one to speak one’s mind 
without fear of persecution.101 Among those protections is the abili-
ty to express messages that involve religion, politics, and matters of 
public concern.102 
During the twentieth century, the notion began to emerge that 
speech, beyond that which was purely political, could also be af-
forded some lesser level of protection.103 The Supreme Court first 
enunciated the concept of commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virgin-
ia,104 holding that even speech that appears as paid commercial ad-
vertisements “is not stripped of First Amendment protection 
merely because it appears in that form.”105 The Court, however, 
stopped short of deciding “the precise extent to which the First 
Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to ac-
                                                                                                                            
information [is] . . . keen” and constitutional protection of commercial speech serves 
society’s interest in “enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking in a democracy”). 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
100 Caitlin Brandon, Note, How a Grocery Store Grounded Air Jordan and Why Jordan 
Should Succeed in the Rematch: Redefining Commercial Speech for the Modern Era, 47 IND. L. 
REV. 543, 545 (2014) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom 
of speech and of the press, which are protected by the First amendment from 
abridgement by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by 
the States.”)). 
101 Scott Wellikoff, Mixed Speech: Inequities that Result from an Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 J. 
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 159, 159 (2004). 
102 Id. at 160. 
103 One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions addressing commercial speech was 
Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which upheld a local ordinance prohibiting 
distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising materials. Although the 
Court’s holding seemed to indicate that commercial speech was not entitled to 
constitutional protection, it would later use Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), to 
clarify that Valentine should not be read as an absolute prohibition of constitutional 
protection for commercial speech. 
104 Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
105 Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 384 
(1973)); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
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tivities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.”106 
The Court would shortly thereafter directly address whether com-
mercial speech warranted any constitutional protection in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,107 in 
which the constitutionality of Virginia’s prohibition against adver-
tising the prices of prescription drugs was analyzed. 
Although the Supreme Court did not provide an explicit test to 
determine what is considered commercial speech, it did provide 
insight as to what is not considered commercial speech: “Commer-
cial speech is neither speech that solicits money nor speech that is 
sold for a profit. Speech is also not necessarily commercial just be-
cause money was spent to project it.”108 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court concluded that there is a strong interest in the free flow of 
information for not only the individual consumer, but for society at 
large.109 As a result, the Court held that the fact that speech is 
commercial does not alone deprive it of constitutional protec-
tion.110 
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy expanded the com-
mercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court had yet to provide an 
explicit test for distinguishing commercial speech from noncom-
mercial speech. The Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission111 finally established a test to determine 
                                                                                                                            
106 Id. at 825. 
107 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For the first time, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
issue of whether there is a First Amendment exception for commercial speech “is 
squarely before us.” Id. at 761. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 762. 
110 Id. at 773. 
111 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) 
(holding that the defendant state’s prohibition on the Public Service Commission’s right 
to advertise its services, despite its “commercial speech” nature, was unconstitutional). 
Subsequent to its decision in Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has offered further 
interpretations of the commercial speech doctrine in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 
(1993). In Edenfield, the Court held that it was not sufficient for the government merely to 
point to a considerable governmental interest and that the government must demonstrate 
that the regulation advanced the interest in a direct and material way. In 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the Court held that there was even less reason to 
start from the strict scrutiny review that the First Amendment generally required when a 
state entirely banned the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial messages 
for reasons not associated with the protection of a fair bargaining process. 
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the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech. 
First, the Court defined commercial speech as an “expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its au-
dience.”112 Next, the Court created a four-part test to determine 
whether the commercial speech in question is protected by the 
First Amendment.113 The four-part test examines: (1) whether the 
expression is protected by the First Amendment, meaning that it 
concerns lawful activity that is not misleading; (2) whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial; if both of the first two 
parts are satisfactorily met then (3) whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.114 The 
Court held that “[t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the reg-
ulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest.”115 
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp.,116 provided further guidance for distinguishing between 
commercial and noncommercial speech. In Bolger, a manufacturer 
and distributor of contraceptives brought an action challenging a 
federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive ad-
vertisements.117 The primary issue was whether the manufacturer’s 
pamphlets contained commercial speech, that is “speech which 
does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”118 The 
                                                                                                                            
112 Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 561–66. 
115 Id. at 564. In order to determine the scope of proper regulation of commercial 
speech, the Supreme Court created a four-step analysis: 
We must (1) determine whether the expression is protected by the 
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask (2) whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and (4) whether it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
Id. at 566. 
116 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
117 Id. at 67–68. 
118 Id. at 67 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
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Court noted that the manufacturer’s informational pamphlets 
could not be characterized merely as proposals to engage in com-
mercial transactions, and that their proper classification as com-
mercial or non-commercial speech presented a closer question.119 
“The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be adver-
tisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are 
commercial speech.”120 Similarly, the reference to a specific prod-
uct does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech.121 
“And finally, the fact that the manufacturer has an economic moti-
vation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by 
itself to turn the materials into commercial speech.”122 Thus, the 
Court identified specific factors that have evolved, through subse-
quent interpretations and applications by lower courts, into the ac-
cepted test to determine if the speech in question is commercial: 
(1) whether the communication is an advertisement, (2) whether 
the communication makes reference to a specific product or ser-
vice, and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation for 
the communication.123 This three-part test became well-known as 
the Bolger test.124 
                                                                                                                            
119 Id. 
120 Id. (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964)). 
121 Id. (citing Associated Students v. Att’y Gen., 368 F. Supp. 11, 24 (C.D. Cal. 1973)). 
122 Id. at 67 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975)). 
123 Id. 
124 According to a recent LexisNexis search, over 578 cases since 1983 have cited the 
Bolger test in a wide variety of factual contexts, including over thirty-three Supreme Court 
decisions and over 167 decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Despite the plethora of 
jurisprudence applying or adopting the Bolger test, there is a growing trend of 
commentators that have proposed different tests. See, e.g., Brandon, supra note 100, at 
557. Brandon proposes an original three-part test to distinguish commercial speech from 
noncommercial speech. The elements of the test are as follows: “(1) identify the speaker 
and weigh the speaker’s motivations, (2) look at the content of the speech itself, and 
(3) assess how the average consumer or reader would view the speech.” Id. Specifically, 
Brandon says the first step is to determine the motive of the speaker. Id. Next, one must 
look to not only the content of the speech, but the mode within which it is being 
delivered. Id. at 557–59. Also, it is essential to take into account the “use of intellectual 
property rights of others by the speaker.” Id. at 558. Finally, the test would look towards 
how the average consumer would view the speech. Id. at 559–60. Brandon emphasizes 
that this factor should analyze the speech broadly, rather than with a narrow focus. Id. at 
559. She argues that courts should look at several factors, including:  
[W]ould the consumer gain some type of truth or objectively useful 
information from the speech . . . ; is there a trademark or trade name 
used which would trigger a commercial association in the mind of the 
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Courts have grappled most often with situations in which the 
challenged communication contains elements of both commercial 
and noncommercial speech. One of the most high profile cases to 
address this issue was Kasky v. Nike, Inc.125 Nike argued that adver-
tisements placed in newspapers, the distribution of press releases, 
and the mailing of letters to athletic directors at major universi-
ties—all of which were designed to counter criticism of the work-
ing conditions of overseas factories manufacturing Nike prod-
ucts—did not amount to commercial speech, and hence were fully 
protected under the First Amendment free speech provisions of 
the U.S. and California constitutions.126 Noting that the U.S. Su-
preme Court “has not adopted an all-purpose test to distinguish 
commercial from noncommercial speech under the First Amend-
ment,”127 the California Supreme Court likewise declined to do 
so.128 Instead, the California court created a limited-purpose test as 
to whether particular speech may be subjected to laws aimed at 
preventing false advertising or other forms of commercial decep-
tion; the test consisted of three elements: the speaker, the intended 
audience, and the content of the message.129 
In holding for the plaintiff, the court concluded that in situa-
tions where there is a commercial speaker, an intended commercial 
audience, and commercial content in the message, the speech 
should be deemed to be commercial in nature.130 The court was 
                                                                                                                            
consumer, allowing the consumer to believe the speaker is speaking 
commercially; or possibly would a persuaded reader be more likely to 
engage in a commercial transaction with the speaker after viewing the 
speech? 
Id. at 560. 
125 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. 
Ct. 2554 (2003). 
126 A determination that Nike’s communications were not commercial speech would 
bar the claims of unfair competition and false advertising brought by plaintiff Kasky, a 
private California citizen. Id. at 262. 
127 See generally Deborah J. LaFetra, Kick it Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205 (2004); David C. Vladeck, Lessons from 
a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004). 
128 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 256–58. The court specifically held that Nike’s statements constituted 
commercial speech because: (1) Nike, being engaged in commerce, is a commercial 
speaker; (2) its statements were addressed directly to actual and potential purchasers of 
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also challenged with how to handle commercial speech that was 
intermingled with what would otherwise be constitutionally-
protected noncommercial speech.131 Relying on Bolger, the court 
held that Nike could not immunize itself simply by including refer-
ences to public issues, especially where the alleged false advertising 
and misleading statements all related to the commercial portions of 
the speech in question.132 The court further held that, because 
modern public relations campaigns are often designed to increase 
sales and profits by enhancing the image of the speaker, the press 
release amounted to commercial speech.133 The court thus con-
cluded that speech is not necessarily entitled to the full protection 
under the First Amendment when it incorporates elements of both 
commercial and noncommercial speech. With the Supreme 
Court’s decision to withdraw its writ of certiorari in Kasky, an op-
portunity was missed to address a critical issue related to commer-
cial speech: whether statements made by commercial enterprises 
which do not directly promote a product or service, but instead 
comment on social issues and general business practices, are com-
mercial speech.134 Hence, the stage remained set for the latest legal 
skirmish over how to define commercial speech, as illustrated in 
the foregoing analysis of the Spitz and Jordan cases. 
                                                                                                                            
its products (a commercial audience); and (3) its representations of fact were of a 
commercial nature because it described its own labor policies and the practices and 
working conditions in factories where its products were made. Id. at 258. 
131 Nike, relying on Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
474 (1989), argued that because its commercial speech was “inextricably intertwined” 
with the noncommercial communications, its communications should be deemed 
noncommercial in its entirety. Citing Fox, the court stated that “[n]o law required Nike to 
combine factual representations about its own labor practices with expressions of opinion 
about economic globalization. . . .” Id. at 260. Although the U.S. Supreme Court initially 
granted a writ of certiorari to hear an appeal, it subsequently dismissed the writ as 
improvidently granted. 
132 Id. at 260 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)). 
133 We see much the same rationale being applied by the Seventh Circuit in Jordan II in 
its application of the “modern” purpose of brand advertising. See infra Part V. 
134 See Robert M. O’Neil, Nike v. Kasky—What Might Have Been, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1259, 1259–60 (2004) (contending that Nike, Inc. v. Kasky provided the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to clarify the “increasingly confusing” commercial speech 
doctrine). 
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III. SPITZ AND ITS RELIANCE ON JORDAN I 
The 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London were widely 
promoted as “the first social media Games.”135 For example, more 
than 220,000 fans “liked” a video highlight posted on Facebook of 
gymnast Gabby Douglas, and Olympians typically generated thou-
sands of new followers immediately after winning gold medals.136 
Further, athletes shared their Olympic experiences via various so-
cial media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.137 
In addition to the athletes themselves, corporate sponsors also em-
braced the power of social media. One of the most high profile ex-
amples was Samsung’s Olympic Genome Project, a Facebook app 
that enabled consumers to explore their personal connections with 
U.S. Olympians and to share this information with their friends in 
other online communities.138 The Genome Project was created on 
the notion that Americans “have long had a strong desire to get 
closer to the Olympians they cheer for, and that current social me-
dia has given rise to an opportunity to do so.”139 Samsung’s Ge-
nome Project, developed in cooperation with the United States 
Olympic Committee, went live in April 2012, and offered fans of 
the upcoming Summer Games “a unique interactive Facebook ex-
perience to the end-user.”140 Once the user accessed the app, a 
splash screen appeared and depicted the Samsung logo behind it. 
As the user further explored the app, it requested consent to access 
the user’s Facebook profile. The app then matched the information 
in the user’s Facebook profile to publicly available information of 
some 8,200 athletes included within the Genome Project database, 
                                                                                                                            
135 Tripp Mickle, Olympic Snapshots: How Will the London Games Be Remembered? 
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/
Issues/2012/08/13/Olympics/Olympic-snapshots.aspx [https://perma.cc/6HK9-
EMQV]. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See infra note 141. 
139 Notice of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to 
California Code of Civil Procedure 426.16 at 4, Spitz v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 
BC 483475, 2013 WL 6816181 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Notice of 
Motion to Strike]. Ironically, Samsung was the defendant in an earlier landmark lawsuit, 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (1993), that broadened the right of 
publicity by “arguably granting Vanna White a monopoly in being a blond co-host or 
sidekick on Wheel of Fortune.” Gervais & Holmes, supra note 80, at 193. 
140 Notice of Motion to Strike, supra note 139, at 5. 
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resulting in an instantaneous display of those Olympians with 
whom the app user shared commonalities such as hometown, 
school, and favorite song.141 
The user could discover additional connections by participating 
in quizzes. The Genome Project then presented the user’s connec-
tions in a virtual “map,” whereby a “Connection Page” displayed 
the user at the center and his or her connections surrounding 
her.142 Since it was created via the user’s personal information, 
each “Connection Page” was thus unique to each user. Once the 
user learned that particular athletes were connected with her, she 
could discover more about the Olympians, view their “profiles,” 
and further explore commonalities.143 These profiles included such 
things as the athlete names, publicly available biographical informa-
tion, and photographs.144 
The Genome Project also served as an online community 
wherein the user could share their connections and compete with 
other users.145 For instance, the app identified the user’s Facebook 
friends who were also shared connections with that particular ath-
lete.146 Additionally, the user could accumulate points by interact-
ing within the community to build their connections, and could also 
more intimately follow their favorite athletes by connecting to their 
Facebook News Feeds, personal websites, and Twitter accounts.147 
As inventive, interactive, and engaging as the Genome Project 
was, Samsung was quick to learn that using Olympic athletes in so-
cial media was not without its legal risks.148 Four months prior to 
the Opening Ceremonies of the London Games, twenty current 
and former Olympians149 sued Samsung and its promotion agency, 
                                                                                                                            
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. The Connections page and profiles were the only parts of the application in which 
an athlete’s name, photograph or biographical information was displayed. Id. at 6. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Opposition to Team Epic LLC’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Complaint, Spitz v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. BC 483475, 2013 WL 6816181 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Opposition to Motion to Strike]. In addition to lead 
plaintiff Mark Spitz, the other plaintiffs consisted of a “who’s who” of Olympic 
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Team Epic, in a California superior court, alleging, inter alia, a vi-
olation of their right of publicity under common law and statutory 
misappropriation of their names and images.150 In response, the 
defendants immediately filed an anti-SLAPP motion: a motion, 
unique to the state of California, designed to limit litigation that 
would impinge the First Amendment.151 Specifically, the anti-
SLAPP statute provides: 
A cause of action against a person arising from any 
act of that person in furtherance of the person’s 
right of petition or free speech under the United 
States or the California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue shall be subject to a special mo-
tion to strike, unless the court determines that the 
plaintiff has established that there is a probability 
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.152 
The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to “encourage partic-
ipation in matters of public significance by allowing a court to 
promptly dismiss unmeritorious actions or claims brought to chill 
                                                                                                                            
champions including: Greg Louganis, Jackie Joyner-Kersee, Janet Evans, Dara Torres, 
Amanda Beard, Aaron Peirsol, Jason Lezak, Cullen Jones, Phil Dalhausser, Bradley 
Schumacher, Jessica Hardy, Brooke Bennett, Kristy Kowal, Christopher Burckle, 
Caroline Burckle, Eric Shanteau, Kim Vanderberg, Margaret Hoelzer, and Brittany 
Hayes. All were or are represented by the same agent, Evan Morgenstein. Id. 
150 Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code provides: 
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, 
without such person’s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the 
prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any 
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result 
thereof. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012). 
151 Notice of Motion to Strike, supra note 139, at 6 (citing Braun v. Chronicle Publ’g 
Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042 (1997). See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015). 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted “to nip SLAPP litigation in the bud” by 
quickly disposing of claims that target the exercise of free speech rights. See Braun, 52 
Cal. App. 4th at 1042. 
152 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1). 
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another’s valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of 
speech.”153 
Although the Spitz decision was lightly-publicized—especially 
given the name renown of the plaintiffs coupled with the public ap-
peal of the Olympics—it nonetheless held important ramifications 
for how athletes could be utilized within social media platforms. 
The Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los 
Angeles ruled in favor of Samsung and Team Epic on its anti-
SLAPP motion, based on its decision that Samsung’s Facebook app 
qualified as fully-protected noncommercial speech.154 As Judge 
Kwan held, the display of the plaintiff’s names, images, and bio-
graphical information “constituted written statements made in a 
public forum and in connection with issues of public impor-
tance.”155 Further, Judge Kwan held that the challenged speech 
contained in the Genome Project was non-commercial speech fully 
protected by the First Amendment, especially given that all the in-
formation was already readily available to the public.156 Judge Kwan 
held that the Olympic Genome Project did not propose a commer-
cial transaction, nor did it contain advertisements for specific Sam-
sung products.157 As she ruled: 
The fact that the logo “Created by Samsung” could 
be seen in the application does not convert the 
Olympic Genome Project into commercial 
speech. . . . The logo merely served to identify Sam-
sung as the creator of the Olympic Genome Project. 
Further, no specific product was specifically refe-
                                                                                                                            
153 Id. § 425.16(a). An anti-SLAPP analysis involves a two-step process. First, the 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s suit is subject to the 
statute by showing his or her challenged acts were taken in furtherance of his or her 
constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Id. § 
425.16(b)(1). If the defendant satisfies this first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate there is a reasonable probability he or she will prevail on the merits at trial. 
Id. 
154 See Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *1. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. The question of whether speech is properly characterized as commercial or non-
commercial is a question of law. The court cited the Jordan I case for the proposition that 
“[s]peech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is what defines 
commercial speech.” Id. 
157 Id. 
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renced or mentioned. Moreover, even if the display 
of the Samsung logo could somehow be viewed as 
introducing minimal elements of commercialism, 
those elements are intertwined with and over-
whelmed by the message’s non-commercial aspects, 
thereby rendering the entirety of the Olympic Ge-
nome Project non-commercial . . . . Finally, the fact 
that Samsung may have acted with economic moti-
vation . . . does not, in and of itself, turn the applica-
tion and its content into commercial speech.158 
Judge Kwan’s analysis chiefly focused on the fact that all of the 
information used by Samsung was already in the public domain. To 
support this, she relied heavily on both Gionfriddo v. Major League 
Baseball159 and CBC.160 Gionfriddo involved a group of rather un-
known former MLB players (including outfielder Al Gionfriddo)161 
who sued the MLB for alleged right of publicity violations based 
upon the league’s inclusion of the players’ names and playing sta-
tistics in its All-Star Game and World Series magazines and on its 
website. The district court in Gionfriddo held that use of the play-
ers’ names and statistics were (1) in connection with news, public 
affairs, or sports accounts, and (2) constituted publication of mat-
ters of public interest.162 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the information conveyed was factual data and sta-
tistics about the players and that MLB was simply making historical 
facts available to the public.163 
                                                                                                                            
158 Id. at 3 (citing Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 743 F.3d 509 
(7th Cir. 2014); Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322 
(2004)). 
159 Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001). 
160 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
161 Gionfriddo, whose major league career totaled 226 games over four seasons 
primarily with the Brooklyn Dodgers, is best remembered for his spectacular catch of a 
drive off the bat of New York Yankees’ Joe DiMaggio in Game Six of the 1947 World 
Series. 
162 See Gionfriddo, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 413–16. 
163 See id. at 411. The court held that such usage was protected by section 3344 of the 
California Civil Code and the constitutional protection of freedom of expression; as such, 
it did not rise to the level of commercial speech. 
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In seeking to distinguish their case, the plaintiffs in Spitz ar-
gued that the players in Gionfriddo had not made claims that their 
names and statistics appeared in the context of advertising; nor had 
they shown that MLB’s usage damaged their marketability.164 In-
stead, they argued that Samsung’s use of their names and images 
were clearly in a commercial context.165 The plaintiffs pointed to 
the fact that Samsung’s name and logo were displayed on every 
page of the app, there were links to Samsung’s corporate website, 
and there were games and quizzes that promised discounts on 
Samsung’s products (although this feature was disabled before the 
official launch of the app).166 In arguing that the app amounted to 
commercial speech, the plaintiffs also alleged that the app’s main 
purpose was to enhance Samsung’s brand identity.167 
Judge Kwan also relied heavily on the Eighth Circuit decision 
in CBC, in which the plaintiff marketer of online fantasy baseball 
games sought declaratory judgment regarding its right to use MLB 
player names, statistics, and other biographical information.168 The 
Eighth Circuit upheld CBC’s right to use this information, ruling 
that “the information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all 
readily available in the public domain, and it would be a strange law 
                                                                                                                            
164 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149, at 11–12. Given the roster of 
nondescript players who joined Gionfriddo in this lawsuit, it is arguable that, to the extent 
that any of these plaintiffs had marketability, it was limited at best. 
165 Id. at 12. Arguably, one key distinguishing factor overlooked by Judge Kwan is that 
Samsung was the sole advertiser in the Genome Project App, whereas the game program 
at issue in Gionfriddo included multiple advertisers. 
166 Id. There were a number of features that were disabled before the launch of the app. 
Judge Kwan held that any features that may have been contemplated, but were not 
activated, were irrelevant for dispensation of the case. 
167 Id. at 8. 
The plain facts . . . establish the commercial purpose of the 
application. All of those pages contain Samsung’s name and 
logo . . . . Incredibly, both Samsung and Team Epic admit that the 
purpose of the Application was to enhance Samsung’s brand identity. 
In paragraph 3 of Doug Hall’s declaration . . . he admits that a goal of 
the Application was to “increase Samsung’s profile among users of 
social media.” 
Id. at 8–9. 
168 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007). For an alternative analysis of the court’s decision in CBC, 
see David G. Roberts Jr., The Right of Publicity and Fantasy Sports: Why the CBC 
Distribution Court Got It Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223 (2007). 
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that a person would not have a First Amendment right to use in-
formation that is available to everyone.”169 The Eighth Circuit fur-
ther found that “the facts in this case barely, if at all, implicate the 
interests that states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights 
of publicity to individuals.”170 Despite the factual differences be-
tween Spitz, Gionfriddo, and CBC, Judge Kwan affirmed the “sig-
nificant public interest in the Olympics and the athletes involved in 
the Olympics”171 and thus fell within California’s statutory “public 
affairs” exemption as set forth in: 
[T]he “use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, 
or likeness in connection with any news, public af-
fairs, or sports broadcast or account, . . . shall not 
constitute a use for which consent is required under 
subdivision (a) . . . . ‘Public affairs’ is largely inter-
preted to “include things that would not necessarily 
be considered news” and “was intended to mean 
something less important than news.”172 
Finally, Judge Kwan stated that the plaintiffs did not “present 
admissible evidence showing that the Olympic Genome Project’s 
use of their names, images and biographical information impaired 
their economic interest. To the contrary, it is equally likely that 
Plaintiffs’ marketability was enhanced by the presentation of their 
names, images and biographical information on the Olympic Ge-
nome Project.”173 
In order to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion, the linchpin ques-
tion before Judge Kwan was whether the speech conveyed in the 
Genome Project App constituted noncommercial speech (thus fall-
                                                                                                                            
169 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 823. 
170 Id. at 824. 
171 Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2. 
172 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2012). Courts have applied the “public affairs” 
exception to protect an extensive variety of sports-related entertainment and expressive 
works. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 818 (applying exception to 
baseball websites); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001) 
(applying exception to game programs); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. 
App. 4th 790 (1995) (applying exception to posters inserted into newspapers and 
magazines); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993) (applying 
exception to a surfing documentary). 
173 Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2 (citing Gionfriddo, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400). 
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ing within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute), or instead should 
be classified as commercial (or a mix of both).174 Judge Kwan held 
that the speech at issue was noncommercial and thus fully pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment. In arriving at this deci-
sion, Judge Kwan heavily relied on Rezec v. Sony Pictures Enter-
tainment, Inc.175 and the district court decision in Jordan I.176 In Re-
zec, the motion picture company depicted in its advertising cam-
paign laudatory reviews that were attributed to a non-existent film 
critic that were alleged to be false.177 Although the Rezec court 
found that the film enjoyed complete First Amendment protection, 
the advertisement itself did not. In distinguishing Rezec, Judge 
Kwan stated that “the Olympic Genome Project does not contain 
false content, nor does it influence potential Facebook users to 
purchase specific Samsung products.”178 
Judge Kwan held that, unlike Rezec, the Genome Project was 
not a case that involved false advertising.179 Furthermore, the Ge-
nome Project did not contain advertisements specifically for par-
ticular Samsung products, did not have a click-through to Sam-
sung’s main website, and did not offer gaming where Facebook us-
ers or consumers could earn discounts on Samsung’s product. The 
linchpin for Judge Kwan’s decision was the lack of any “call to ac-
tion” to purchase specific Samsung products.180 Hence, while the 
deceitful movie reviews advertised in the Rezec case could have 
likely induced potential moviegoers to purchase tickets, there was 
nothing in the Genome Project that, as determined by Judge Kwan, 
could or would serve to induce users of the app to purchase Sam-
sung products.181 Judge Kwan also relied heavily on the district 
court opinion in Jordan I.182 Before discussing Kwan’s rationale, an 
overview of the facts of Jordan I is warranted. 
                                                                                                                            
174 See id. 
175 Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 135 (2004). 
176 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
177 Rezec, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 137. 
178 Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 2–3. 
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A. Jordan I Background 
In 2009, Michael Jordan was inducted into the Basketball Hall 
of Fame.183 Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative 
issue that exclusively featured Jordan’s career.184 The issue was not 
distributed to magazine subscribers, but was instead sold in stores. 
The defendant, operator of Chicago area grocery chain Jewel-Osco, 
was provided a free full-page ad in the magazine in exchange for 
selling the issue in its stores.185 The congratulatory ad was placed 
on the inside back cover of the magazine; it featured an image of a 
pair of sneakers featuring Jordan’s number “23,” and text that 
read: 
A Shoe In! After six NBA championships, scores of 
rewritten record books and numerous buzzer bea-
ters, Michael Jordan’s elevation in the Basketball 
Hall of Fame was never in doubt! Jewel-Osco sa-
lutes #23 on his many accomplishments as we honor 
a fellow Chicagoan who was “just around the cor-
ner” for so many years.186 
Under this text, the ad also featured Jewel-Osco’s registered 
trademark logo and its marketing slogan, “Good things are just 
around the corner.”187 
In response, Jordan sued Jewel-Osco alleging, inter alia, viola-
tions of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act.188 The district court be-
                                                                                                                            
183 See Hall of Famers, NAISMITH MEMORIAL BASKETBALL HALL OF FAME, 
http://www.hoophall.com/hall-of-famers-index/ [https://perma.cc/28FP-T2JF] (last 
visited May 22, 2016). 
184 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/5 (2016).  
 As used in this Act: “Commercial purpose” means the 
public use or holding out of an individual’s identity (i) on or in 
connection with the offering for sale or sale of a product, 
merchandise, goods, or services; (ii) for purposes of advertising or 
promoting products, merchandise, goods, or services; or (iii) for the 
purpose of fundraising. “Identity” means any attribute of an 
individual that serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, 
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gan its analysis by stating that “[a] significant and potentially dis-
positive issue”189 was whether Jewel-Osco’s advertisement was 
noncommercial speech, which would receive full First Amendment 
protection, or “commercial speech,” which would receive lesser 
protection.190 In siding for the defendant, the district court first 
noted that “the test for identifying commercial speech”191 turns on 
whether the speech proposed a commercial transaction.192 The dis-
trict court stated: 
It is difficult to see how Jewel’s page could be 
viewed, even with the benefit of multiple layers of 
green eyeshades, as proposing a commercial trans-
action. The text recounts some of Jordan’s accom-
plishments and congratulates him on his career and 
induction into the Hall of Fame. The shoes, the 
number 23, and the hardwood floor evoke Jordan 
and the sport and team for which he enjoyed his 
principal success. . . . At the most basic level, the 
page does not propose any kind of commercial 
                                                                                                                            
reasonable viewer or listener, including but not limited to (i) name, 
(ii) signature, (iii) photograph, (iv) image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice.  
Id. 
 Jordan also alleged violations of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)), the 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 505/1 (2007)), and the common law tort of unfair competition. Jordan I, 851 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1102. 
189 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
190 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
561–63 (1980) (holding that whether speech is to be classified as commercial or 
noncommercial is a matter of law to be decided by the court); see also Bolger v. Youngs 
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
191 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc. 507 U.S. 410 (1993)). 
192 Id. The court, in endeavoring to define commercial speech, also relied on Board of 
Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), and Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). See Fox, 492 U.S. at 482 (citing Sorell, 131 S. Ct. at 
2674 (referencing the “commonsense distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech”); Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (“[S]peech that proposes a commercial 
transaction . . . is what defines commercial speech.”)). 
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transaction, as readers would be at a loss to explain 
what they have been invited to buy.193 
Hence, the judge ruled that Jewel-Osco’s congratulatory adver-
tisement was protected free speech, holding that the ad was a work 
in service of honoring and congratulating Jordan: a “tribute by an 
established Chicago business to Chicago’s most accomplished ath-
lete.”194 The court further held that there was no profit motivation 
to commercially exploit the Jordan brand since Jewel-Osco was not 
compensated by TIME, Inc. for having created the ad.195 
B. Spitz Court’s Application of Jordan I 
Likewise, in Judge Kwan’s judgment, one could not argue that 
Samsung, despite the presence of its corporate logo and slogan, was 
engaged in anything more than a simple “proposal” of a commer-
cial transaction because no specific Samsung products were adver-
tised or promoted in the Genome Project.196 Analogous to the ra-
tionale in Jordan I, Samsung did not specifically encourage con-
sumers to go to a consumer electronics store or to go online to pur-
chase Samsung products.197 Judge Kwan conceded, while citing to 
Jordan I, that “even if the display of the Samsung logo could 
somehow be viewed as introducing minimal elements of commer-
cialism, those elements are intertwined with and overwhelmed by 
the message’s non-commercial aspects, thereby rendering the enti-
rety of the Olympic Genome Project non-commercial.”198 
                                                                                                                            
193 Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1106–07. 
194 Id. at 1110–11. 
195 See id. at 1111. 
196 See id. 
197 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149. The plaintiffs argued that the 
Genome Project App was clearly intended to drive sales of Samsung products and to 
enhance Samsung’s brand awareness with consumers. They further argued that Samsung 
used the athlete’s names and images without approval with the intent of creating the 
impression that Plaintiffs were endorsers of Samsung’s products and business. 
198 Spitz v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. BC 483475, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013). Similarly, the district court in Jordan I recognized that even if 
the presence of the store’s slogan in the advertisement (“Just Around the Corner”) could 
be arguably perceived as presenting some nominal commercial components, that element 
was intermingled with the message’s noncommercial elements, consequently 
transforming the entire advertisement into noncommercial speech. Jordan I, 851 F. Supp. 
2d at 1108. 
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Judge Kwan thus held that users exploring Samsung’s Face-
book app would be unlikely to believe that they were being invited 
to purchase any Samsung products.199 Further, she held that the 
fact that Samsung might have acted with economic motivation in 
generating the Genome Project did not, in and of itself, render the 
Facebook app commercial speech.200 Nor, she held, did Jewel-
Osco’s economic motivation for generating and placing its page in 
the commemorative issue transform its congratulatory advertise-
ment into commercial speech.201 
The plaintiffs argued that noncommercial “public interest” 
protected speech, when mixed with commercial speech, was not 
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute or by the Constitution.202 In 
addition, the athletes asserted that the app’s use of their name and 
image could not be protected since it improperly inserted public 
interest information with product and brand advertising.203 The 
plaintiffs relied in particular on Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch.204 
In 1999, surfers George Downing, Paul Strauch, Rick Steere, 
Richard Buffalo Keaulana, and Ben Aipa sued Abercrombie & 
Fitch, alleging the apparel company had misappropriated their 
names and likenesses for commercial use.205 In this case, a picture 
featuring the plaintiffs engaged in a surfing competition held over 
thirty years prior was used by Abercrombie & Fitch in its cata-
log.206 The defendants argued, on the basis of the First Amend-
ment, that the photographed illustrated an article about surfing, a 
matter of public interest.207 The court held, however, that “there is 
a tenuous relationship between [the] photograph and the theme 
presented. Abercrombie used [the] photograph essentially as win-
dow dressing to advance the catalog’s surf theme” and thus not 
protected by the First Amendment.208 
                                                                                                                            
199 Spitz, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149, at 2. 
203 Id. 
204 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001). 
205 Id. at 999. 
206 Id. at 1000. 
207 Id. at 1002. 
208 Id. 
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In opposition to the defendants’ argument that there was no di-
rect connection between the alleged use of the Olympic athletes 
and the commercial purpose, the plaintiffs argued that the defen-
dants had conceded an economic motivation for the app (specifical-
ly, to enhance Samsung’s brand image). Moreover, as the plaintiffs 
pointed out, citing Downing, “the Court never discussed whether 
there was a direct connection between the use of the picture and 
the defendant’s economic motivation, but implicitly found one, 
because it upheld the plaintiffs’ claim, even though the plaintiffs 
were never even identified in the catalog.”209 According to the 
plaintiffs’ claim, it was not an important issue whether or not there 
was direct connection between the use of the athletes’ picture and 
the commercial purpose in Downing.210 According to the Court’s 
decision in Downing, in addition, the use of the picture was held to 
not be protected as a matter of public interest and Abercrombie & 
Fitch could not be entitled to allege a First Amendment defense.211 
For these reasons, the defendants in Spitz argued that Downing did 
not apply to the Genome Project because of the indirect connection 
between the use of the athletes and the defendants’ economic mo-
tivation.212 
The plaintiffs also relied on Kasky213 in arguing that Samsung’s 
Genome Project should be classified as commercial speech.214 
However, Judge Kwan determined that the Kasky decision, like 
that in Downing, was in essence a false advertising case: “In con-
trast [to Nike] . . . the Olympic Genome Project does not make any 
representation of fact about Samsung’s products, does not promote 
specific Samsung products, and does not make any representations 
of fact about Samsung’s business, let alone representations alleged 
to be false.”215 Having thus determined that (1) Samsung’s Face-
book app constituted public interest speech, (2) such speech was 
noncommercial in nature, and (3) the plaintiffs were unlikely to 
                                                                                                                            
209 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149, at 11. 
210 Id. 
211 Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002. 
212 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149, at 11.  
213 See supra notes 125–35 and accompanying text. 
214 Opposition to Motion to Strike, supra note 149, at 11. 
215 Spitz v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. BC 483475, 2013 WL 6816181, at *2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013). 
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succeed on the merits of the case, Judge Kwan upheld the defen-
dants’ anti-SLAPP motion.216 
IV. JORDAN II: SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS “IMAGE 
ADVERTISING” 
In February 2014, the Seventh Circuit overruled the lower 
court in holding that Jewel-Osco’s congratulatory advertisement 
amounted to commercial speech, and thus remanded the case back 
to the lower court to determine Jordan’s claims and damages.217 
The Seventh Circuit began by acknowledging that the Supreme 
Court has generally “worked out” the commercial speech doctrine 
in public law cases,218 while noting that the Jordan case involved a 
“clash of private rights.”219 
                                                                                                                            
216 Id. at *3. 
217 Jordan II, 743 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
the issue before it was simply whether the advertisement in question should be classified 
as commercial or noncommercial speech. The Seventh Circuit elaborated, however, that 
even if the ad is held to be noncommercial speech, “it is far from clear that Jordan’s 
trademark and right-of-publicity claims fail without further ado.” Id. at 514. Citing 
renowned trademark expert McCarthy, and the fact that the Supreme Court has yet to 
address this issue, the Seventh Circuit added that “there is a no judicial consensus on 
how to resolve conflicts between intellectual-property rights and free-speech rights; 
instead the courts have offered ‘a buffet of various legal approaches to [choose] from.’” 
Id. (citing 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 31.139). 
218 Such cases have included: a challenge to a municipal ban on distribution of 
commercial publications on newsstands on public property (City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)); a challenge to a public university’s ban on 
“Tupperware”-style housewares parties in dormitories (Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)); a challenge to a state statute regulating fees charged by 
professional charitable fundraisers (Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 
781 (1988)); a challenge to a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited 
contraceptive advertisements (Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)); 
a challenge to a state regulation banning promotional advertising by utilities (Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)); and a 
challenge to a state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the prices of 
prescription drugs (Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976)).  
 As noted by the Seventh Circuit, in the public-law context, “the 
commercial/noncommercial classification determines the proper standard of scrutiny to 
apply to the law or regulation under review in the case.” Jordan II, 743 F.3d 509, 514 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
219 Jordan II, 743 F.3d at 514. 
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision turned on two issues: (1) how 
to define the scope of commercial speech and (2) how to handle 
advertising that contains elements of both commercial and non-
commercial speech. Regarding the first issue, the court first ac-
knowledged the accepted definition of commercial speech: 
“[S]peech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction 
‘fall[s] within the core notion of commercial speech . . . .’”220 
However, as the court continued, “other communications may also 
represent commercial speech despite the fact that they contain dis-
cussions of important public issues.”221 
The Seventh Circuit was specifically challenged with how to 
classify speech that contained both commercial and noncommercial 
elements, as was deemed to be the case here.222 The court first 
turned to Bolger,223 which provides three guideposts for classifying 
speech that contains both commercial and noncommercial ele-
ments, including “whether (1) the speech is an advertisement, (2) 
the speech refers to a specific product, and (3) the speaker has an 
economic motivation for the speech.”224 As the court elaborated: 
“This is just a general framework, however; no one factor is suffi-
cient, and Bolger strongly implied that all are not necessary.”225 
Still, the core of the court’s analysis focused on the second element 
                                                                                                                            
220 Id. at 516 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66). 
221 Id. (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 475). The Seventh Circuit added that the Supreme Court 
has “made clear that advertising which links a product to a current public debate is not 
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Id. 
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
637 (1985)). 
222 Id. at 517. The Seventh Circuit used Jordan II as an opportunity to clarify the proper 
use of the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine, which the district court had relied upon in 
holding for Jewel-Osco. Id. at 520. The court writes: “That doctrine holds that when 
commercial speech and noncommercial speech are inextricably intertwined, the speech is 
classified by reference to the whole; a higher degree of scrutiny may be applied if the 
relevant speech ‘taken as a whole’ is properly deemed noncommercial.” Id. (citing Fox, 
492 U.S. at 474). The Seventh Circuit, in arguing that the court in Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001), misapplied the doctrine, went on to 
suggest that it is difficult to identify a scenario in which both commercial and 
noncommercial speech could be “inextricably intertwined”: “No law of man or nature 
compelled Jewel to combine commercial and noncommercial messages as it did here.” Id. 
at 522. 
223 Bolger, 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
224 Jordan II, 743 F.3d at 517. 
225 Id. 
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of the Bolger test.226 Although Jewel-Osco argued that its adver-
tisement did not propose a commercial transaction because it did 
not promote a specific product or service, the Seventh Circuit took 
an entirely different view: 
The notion that an advertisement counts as “com-
mercial” only if it makes an appeal to purchase a 
particular product makes no sense today, and we 
doubt that it ever did. An advertisement is no less 
“commercial” because it promotes brand awareness 
or loyalty rather than explicitly proposing a transac-
tion in a specific product or service. Applying the 
“core” definition of commercial speech too rigidly 
ignores this reality. Very often the commercial mes-
sage is general and implicit rather than specific and 
explicit.227 
It was clear, the Seventh Circuit held, that the text of the adver-
tisement was indeed “a congratulatory salute to Jordan.”228 How-
ever, the court focused on context of the advertisement, which in-
cluded Jewel’s own graphic logo and slogan, by stating: “[I]f the 
literal import of the words [in the ad] were all that mattered, this 
celebratory tribute would be noncommercial. But evaluating the 
text requires consideration of the context . . . . Modern commercial 
advertising is enormously varied in form and style.”229 Hence, in 
adopting a broader interpretation of the term “commercial,” the 
court held that “an advertisement is no less ‘commercial’ because 
it promotes brand awareness or loyalty rather than explicitly pro-
posing a transaction in a specific product or service.”230 
The Seventh Circuit stressed that while the proposing of spe-
cific commercial transactions are at the “core” of commercial 
speech, such propositions do not demarcate the outer limits of 
                                                                                                                            
226 Id. at 519. 
227 Id. at 518. 
228 Id. at 517–18. The court rejected Jewel-Osco’s argument that this advertisement was 
similar to others that Jewel-Osco had released in the past, which celebrated the work of 
local civic groups. Id. at 518. 
229 Id. at 517–18. 
230 Id. at 518. 
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what is commercial speech.231 Rather, even if speech does some-
thing more than (or in addition to) proposing a commercial transac-
tion, it can still be commercial.232 As the court stated, Jewel-Osco’s 
advertisement served two functions: (1) congratulating Jordan, and 
(2) enhancing Jewel’s brand by associating itself with Jordan in the 
minds of basketball fans and Chicago consumers.233 Given that a 
“common-sense distinction” between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech was proper, in this context, the court had to ac-
count for the varied, often subtle forms of modern advertising.234 
Thus, an ad’s failure to refer to a specific product was held to be 
relevant, but not dispositive.235 The court had no trouble answering 
the question, “What does [the ad] invite the readers to buy?”236 
The answer: “Whatever they need from a grocery store.”237 
Hence, the Seventh Circuit ruled that this kind of brand advertis-
ing is not any less commercial than product advertising, since its 
“commercial nature is readily apparent” and it was “aimed at 
promoting goodwill for the Jewel-Osco brand by exploiting public 
affection for Jordan.”238 However sincere its congratulations, the 
court reasoned, Jewel-Osco still “had something to gain” from the 
ad.239 
The Seventh Circuit decision found particular significance in 
the characteristics and relevance of the logo and slogan as pre-
sented in the advertisement: 
Jewel-Osco’s graphic logo and slogan appear just be-
low the textual salute to Jordan. The bold red logo is 
prominently featured in the center of the ad and in a 
font size larger than any other on the page. Both the 
logo and the slogan are styled in their trademarked 
                                                                                                                            
231 Id. at 516. 
232 Id. at 518. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 517–18. 
235 Id. at 518. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 520. The court also noted the fact that the trade deal between Jewel-Osco and 
Sports Illustrated, in which the former received a free full-page advertisement in 
exchange for selling the magazine in its stores, provided a clear economic benefit for 
Jewel-Osco. Id. at 519–20. 
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ways. Their style, size, and color set them off from 
the congratulatory text, drawing attention to Jewel-
Osco’s sponsorship of the tribute.240 
The Seventh Circuit stated that the linkage that Jewel-Osco 
created between their logo, slogan, and Jordan as “a fellow Chica-
goan who was ‘just around the corner’ for so many years” was 
used to promote shopping at Jewel-Osco stores.241 The Seventh 
Circuit added that “[e]ven though the commercial nature of the ad 
may be generic and implicit, it is clear that it is a form of image ad-
vertising, which promotes goodwill for the Jewel-Osco brand “by 
exploiting public affection for Jordan at an auspicious moment in 
his career.”242 The court defined image advertising as a “form of 
advertising featur[ing] appealing images and subtle messages 
alongside the advertiser’s brand name or logo with the aim of link-
ing the advertiser to a particular person, value, or idea in order to 
build goodwill for the brand.”243 In other words, congratulating 
Jordan on his induction into the Hall of Fame seemed reasonable, 
but “considered in context, and without the rose-colored glasses, 
Jewel’s ad has an unmistakable commercial function: enhancing 
the Jewel-Osco brand in the minds of consumers. This commercial 
message is implicit but easily inferred, and is the dominant one.”244 
The Seventh Circuit went on to expand the Bolger test noting that 
the Supreme Court foreshadowed that while the failure to refer-
ence a specific product is a relevant consideration in the commer-
cial-speech determination, it is far from dispositive, especially 
where “image” or brand advertising rather than product advertis-
ing is concerned.245 
In remanding the case back to the district court, the Seventh 
Circuit took the opportunity to also clarify the district court’s mi-
sapplication of the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine.246 Jordan 
argued that the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine was not appli-
                                                                                                                            
240 Id. at 518. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. (emphasis added). 
243 Id. at 520. 
244 Id. at 518–19. 
245 Id. at 519 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)). 
246 Id. at 520–21. 
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cable to this case.247 Specifically, Jordan argued that the district 
court had erroneously concluded that any advertisement that has a 
combination of both commercial and noncommercial speech 
should be deemed noncommercial speech because they are “inex-
tricably intertwined” and cannot be separated out.248 
The Seventh Circuit, in concurring with Jordan I, held that the 
“central inquiry [was] not whether the speech in question com-
bines commercial and noncommercial elements, but whether it was 
legally or practically impossible for the speaker to separate 
them.”249 It thus held that a single presentation that combines 
commercial and noncommercial elements does not automatically 
make the speech noncommercial.250 Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded that the district court wrongly relied on a Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.251 that itself misap-
plied the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine.252 According to the 
Seventh Circuit, the commercial and noncommercial elements of 
the Jewel-Osco ad were not “inextricably intertwined”: “No law of 
man or nature compelled Jewel to combine commercial and non-
commercial messages as it did here.”253 As a result, the district 
court should not have held that the commercial speech in the con-
gratulatory advertisement was so intertwined with the noncom-
mercial speech that they could not be separated.254 Jewel-Osco was 
not compelled by government regulation to incorporate the com-
mercial speech in the advertisement and, thus, the “inextricably 
intertwined” doctrine was held not applicable.255 
                                                                                                                            
247 Id. at 521. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)). 
250 Id. 
251 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
252 Id. In Hoffman, actor Dustin Hoffman sued a magazine publisher for 
misappropriating his identity. Specifically, a fashion article featured movie stills that had 
been altered to make it appear as though the actors were modeling clothing from famous 
designers. Id. at 1183. Dustin Hoffman in his role in the film “Tootsie” was included in 
the article. The Ninth Circuit held that the article was fully protected noncommercial 
speech, because any commercial aspects are “inextricably intertwined” with expressive 
elements and, therefore, cannot be separated out. Id. at 1185. 
253 Jordan II, 743 F.3d at 522. 
254 See id. 
255 Id. 
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As the court concluded: 
A contrary holding would have sweeping and troub-
lesome implications for athletes, actors, celebrities, 
and other trademark holders seeking to protect the 
use of their identities or marks . . . . Classifying this 
kind of advertising as constitutionally immune non-
commercial speech would permit advertisers to mi-
sappropriate the identity of athletes and other cele-
brities with impunity.256 
As a result, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for further 
proceedings, thus giving Jordan the green light to resume pursuit of 
his right of publicity claim in which he sought five million dollars in 
damages,257 and the parties eventually settled.258 
V. DISCUSSION 
The Spitz and Jordan cases have added yet another tile to the 
mosaic of competing rights. On one side of the scales of justice, we 
have the athlete’s right to control the form and manner in which 
his or her name, image and likeness (otherwise referred to a perso-
na or identity) are used without authorization for the “purposes of 
trade.” On the other side, we have the First Amendment protec-
tions accorded by the right of free speech and expression. Adding 
further complexity to this balancing act is an ongoing quandary 
over how to define and distinguish non-commercial speech from 
commercial speech, particularly within the context of today’s mod-
ern image (or so-called brand) advertising. The increasing domin-
ance of digital media as a platform for image advertising only por-
tends, as suggested by Gervais and Holmes, escalating chal-
lenges.259 The Seventh Circuit decision in Jordan I, while creating 
some clarity and guidelines for future brand marketers, also leaves 
                                                                                                                            
256 Id. at 520. 
257 Rovell, supra note 12. 
258 See Seidel, supra note 16. 
259 See Gervais & Holmes, supra note 80, at 183. Indeed, one can wonder the outcome if 
Jewel-Osco’s creative congratulatory message was communicated on its Twitter or 
Facebook account as opposed to in the pages of Sports Illustrated? Would the delivery 
vehicle, or ephemeralness, matter? 
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us with yet another wrinkle, particularly when viewed alongside the 
court’s holding in Spitz.260 
Courts and commentators continue to grapple with ways to ar-
ticulate clear and generally applicable guidelines to resolve this 
conflict.261 Beyond the well-established triumvirate enunciated by 
the various courts for use in analyzing expressive mediums (the 
transformative use, relatedness (or Rogers) and predominant use 
tests),262 legal scholars have also proposed a plethora of novel ap-
proaches for balancing these important interests, the premise of 
which was appropriately suggested by one legal scholar: “[A] vague 
variety of tests must not be allowed to result in situations where 
public figures can turn their right of publicity into a right of censor-
ship.”263 While not within the scope of this Article, it is worth not-
ing a few of the prevailing themes, some of which naturally overlap: 
(1) a focus on the “primary motivation” of the plaintiff, including 
but not limited to the speaker’s economic motivations;264 (2) a fo-
                                                                                                                            
260 The authors readily acknowledge differences in the advertising campaigns: 
Samsung’s campaign utilizes the images of multiple athletes in connection with the 
publicly available statistical and biographical information, while the Jordan case involves 
the use of a single athlete in a congratulatory ad context. This, however, does not alter the 
fact that both campaigns were image advertising-based, and the decisions in both cases 
premised on a determination of what constitutes noncommercial versus commercial 
speech. 
261 See Volokh, supra note 92, at 929–30 (“The right of publicity may seem intuitively 
appealing to many people. The notion that my name and likeness are my property seems 
to make sense. But, when applied to expression, ‘my property’ is another way of saying 
‘legally forbidden to be another’s speech.’”); see also W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann 
Linquist, Tranformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial Publicity Rights and the First 
Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171, 179–80 (2004) (“As the Right of Publicity has become 
a more familiar cause of action, pleading of First Amendment defenses has increased and 
let to an unfortunate friction between these rights.”). 
262 See Lee, supra note 71. 
263 Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 
Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2014). 
264 See Brandon, supra note 100 (discussing the Jordan district court decision and 
presciently predicting the Seventh Circuit rationale in overturning the same); see also 
Gloria Franke, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture 
the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. REV. 945 (2006); Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 
11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301 (2004) (proposing a test resembling copyright’s fair use 
doctrine that incorporates a transformative factor and the Second Circuit’s 
“newsworthy” test, as set forth in Titan Sports v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d 
Cir. 1989), premised on the question of whether the economic value derives from the 
artistic expression or the celebrity). But see Redish & Shust, supra note 63, at 1481, 1488 
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cus on the degree of bad faith intent, or malice, of the defendant;265 
(3) a focus on the type of medium used;266 and (4) a focus on a ra-
tionale of consumer confusion premised upon the application of 
trademark law principles to such cases.267 
In Spitz, the court held that a brand advertising campaign in-
corporating athletes’ names and likenesses is noncommercial 
speech because the campaign does not promote a specific product or 
service. The court in Spitz, relying heavily on Jordan I, ruled that 
the logo “Created by Samsung” was used simply to identify Sam-
sung as the company responsible for the creation of the Olympic 
Genome Project.268 It held, further, that even if the logo introduced 
“minimal elements of commercialism, those elements are intert-
wined with and overwhelmed by the message’s non-commercial 
                                                                                                                            
(arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jordan II discriminates against speech 
solely on the basis of the speaker’s profit motivation: “[A]pplication of the foundational 
theory of modern commercial speech doctrine to the right of publicity underscores the 
starkly irrational nature of the rationale for such reduced protection. Simply put, 
commercial speech receives reduced protection for no reason other than the profit 
motivation behind it. . . . In no other area of free speech law do we turn decisions 
exclusively on a speaker’s motivation.”). 
265 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 63, at 795–98. “[T]o avoid a chilling effect on the First 
Amendment, it is time to create a new sense of balance that limits one’s property rights to 
the situation in which they were intended: sole commercial purpose.” Id. at 809. 
266 See, e.g., Russell S. Jones, Jr., The Flip Side of Privacy: The Right of Publicity, The First 
Amendment, and Constitutional Line Drawing—A Presumptive Approach, 39 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 939 (2006). 
A court should ask, first, what is the “medium” at issue: is it plainly 
merchandise or a product, sold and marketed as such, such that its 
commercial value comes exclusively (or almost exclusively) from the 
celebrity’s name or likeness . . . ? If so, there would be a presumption 
that the right of publicity would prevail over any First Amendment or 
free speech defense . . . . In order for the First Amendment to win 
out, the defendant would have to make a strong enough showing that 
his or her purpose was informative or expressive, not exploitative, to 
convince the court to overcome the presumption. 
Id. at 958. 
267 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dolgan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn 
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 116 (2006); Susannah M. Rooney, Just Another 
Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward a Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a 
Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921 (2013). 
268 Spitz v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. BC 483475, 2013 WL 6816181, at 3 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (order granting defendant Team Epic LLC’s special motion to 
strike plaintiffs’ first amended complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 425.16). 
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aspects, thereby rendering the entirety of the Olympic Genome 
Project non-commercial.”269 Hence, we see freedom of speech (the 
right to use information readily available in the public domain) 
trumping the right of publicity in the context of image advertising. 
In Jordan II, involving celebration of an athlete’s Hall of Fame 
achievement, the Seventh Circuit holds that an advertisement need 
not promote a specific product or service; instead, given the con-
tent-based particulars of the Jewel-Osco advertisement, it amounts 
to commercial speech due primarily to its classification as image 
advertising. In the context of the modern realities of consumer ad-
vertising, the Seventh Circuit set precedent in overturning the “in-
extricably intertwined” doctrine as relied upon in Spitz and Jordan 
I.270 Hence, we see the right of publicity trumping the freedom of 
Jewel-Osco to express itself with regard to Michael Jordan: “Con-
grats Michael!” 
The Seventh Circuit, in assessing the facts in Jordan II, clearly 
embraced the opportunity to expand the Bolger test to better align 
with the realities of modern advertising (i.e., that a company’s im-
age advertising serves as much a purpose of “selling” as does an 
advertisement for a specific product or service.271 Indeed, the deci-
sion appears precedent-setting).272 Hence, given the new import of 
image advertising, the Seventh Circuit decision arguably serves to 
                                                                                                                            
269 Id. 
270 Based on the Seventh Circuit’s holding, Spitz would likely be wearing another 
victory medal! 
271 What is not so clear is the outcome of this case had it involved a much less famous 
and revered celebrity than Michael Jordan. What is also not quite clear, and serves as the 
basis of a novel argument posited by Redish & Shust, supra note 63, is why corporate 
advertisers should not be treated the same as traditional media companies who utilize 
celebrity likenesses, since both have the same profit motivation. By way of example: 
BMW should be able to state in a print ad that Tom Cruise drives a BMW (assuming its 
truthfulness) in the same way that NBC News can report this in a story. It points to a 
double standard that begs the question: Why could Jewel-Osco not congratulate Jordan in 
an ad, but TIME, Inc., owners of Sports Illustrated, can use Jordan’s name and likeness to 
create an entire magazine, sell advertising in it, and then sell the magazine itself for 
substantial profit? Arguably, isn’t Sports Illustrated’s usage much more egregious? 
Jordan’s induction into the Hall of Fame was no more or less timely, or newsworthy, for 
Sports Illustrated than it was for Jewel-Osco. 
272 A LexisNexis search for “image advertising” as commercial speech in athletes’ 
cases revealed no cases on point. It remains to be seen if similar doctrine will be adopted 
by other circuits (most notably, in light of the quick disposal of Spitz in California in the 
Ninth Circuit). 
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yet further expand (on the heels of the EA Sports rulings) the range 
of causes of action for athletes under the right of publicity doc-
trine.273 As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult to envision 
just how a company could express itself in congratulating a celebri-
ty concerning a matter of public record without risking a right of 
publicity violation—a chilling notion. After all, only the least legal-
ly savvy of advertisers would combine a congratulatory message 
with a coupon.274 Given these factors, however, Jordan II does 
provide guidance on how this can be accomplished (at least with 
minimal legal risk) by establishing a continuum of sorts. 
On one end of the continuum, the Seventh Circuit states that 
an advertisement that incorporates a brand logo and slogan is to be 
considered commercial in nature; the fact that it doesn’t identify or 
promote a specific product is irrelevant in today’s advertising 
world.275 On the other end, it applies a content-based analysis of 
Jewel-Osco’s advertisement that suggests that, absent some ele-
ments and creative executions, would place it within the realm of 
noncommercial speech. Although the Seventh Circuit’s content-
specific analysis of the Jewel-Osco’s advertisement arguably 
creates many gray areas for future advertising copywriters and 
layout designers, one can also view the decision as providing a 
roadmap for how companies can utilize athlete personae in adver-
tising (particularly congratulatory messaging) without violating the 
right of publicity. In fact, this roadmap was proposed to the court 
by Jordan’s legal team: 
If Jewel and Supervalu merely wanted to congratu-
late Jordan as they claim, they easily could have 
done so. They could have privately congratulated 
Jordan. If they wanted to publicly congratulate Jor-
dan, they could have done so without identifying 
themselves as speakers. And if they wanted to pub-
licly congratulate Jordan and identify themselves as 
the speakers, they could have done so using their 
                                                                                                                            
273 See supra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
274 See Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 115 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
275 Jordan II, 743 F.3d 509, 519 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Dismissing the logo and slogan as 
‘mere nametags’ overlooks their value as advertising tools.”). 
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corporate names (Jewel Food Stores, Inc. and Su-
pervalu).276 
In other words, if Jewel-Osco had not prominently featured its 
brand logo and company slogan larger than its congratulatory mes-
saging, had not cleverly married its slogan with Michael Jordan as 
(“Good things . . . just around the corner”), and had not espoused 
their shared geography (“fellow Chicagoans”), arguably Jordan 
could have been publicly congratulated within the parameters of 
the law. One can argue, alternatively, that the guidance for future 
congratulatory advertising boils down to this: creativity may kill.277 
CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jordan II, through both its 
novel application of the Bolger test and analysis of mixed-messaged 
speech, arguably continues the expansion of publicity rights that 
comes on the heels of the EA Sports line of cases. Furthermore, 
Jordan II’s embrace of “image advertising” as a proxy for advertis-
ing of specific products, in conjunction with the athletes’ right of 
publicity creates the potential chilling effect for companies and 
brands desiring to express themselves on matters of public interest 
and other newsworthy events involving athletes (including but not 
limited to recognition of career achievements and honors).278 As 
established by the Seventh Circuit, the consumer does not have to 
be invited to purchase a specific product in order for an advertise-
ment to be deemed commercial speech. While it is not within the 
scope of this Article to reconcile Jordan II with the numerous and 
varied approaches to balancing commercial speech with the right of 
publicity doctrine,279 the Seventh Circuit has provided several im-
                                                                                                                            
276 Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Jordan’s Opening Brief and Required Short Appendix at 
30, Jordan II, 743 F.3d 509. 
277 Indeed, one can argue, from the corporate marketer’s standpoint, that the fatal flaw 
in the Jewel-Osco’s congratulatory ad was simply the advertising copywriters’ desire to 
be clever and creative. 
278 See Gervais & Holmes, supra note 80. “Indeed, the uncertainly associated with 
liability stemming from the right of publicity is potentially chilling speech.” Id. at 211–12 
(noting that EA Sports, in the face of legal challenges to the game’s use of college football 
players, ceased production of its popular NCAA Football videogame). 
279 See supra Section I.F and Part II. 
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portant guidelines for corporations and brands seeking to utilize 
athletes in advertising that would, at first glance, appear to be non-
commercial in nature. First, the decision creates some degree of 
clarity in how closely and creatively an advertiser can align its 
brand messaging and indicia with the athlete. For corporations de-
veloping advertising and promotional literature, Jordan II further 
stresses the importance of reviewing advertisements for logos and 
other taglines, and in particular the size and location of such identi-
fying marks in conjunction with the athlete identifiers. Jordan’s 
$8.9 million jury verdict against Dominick’s, coupled with his addi-
tional compensation deriving from the unreported settlement with 
Jewel-Osco,280 shows that even with a congratulatory message, 
judges and juries may not necessarily permit companies to get away 
unscathed for using a player’s image without permission, even if 
used in a non-traditional advertising context. The interplay be-
tween advertising and athletes’ rights of publicity has always re-
quired a delicate balance. For the time being, Jordan II has at least 
shined a brighter line on how corporations can navigate this world 
while limiting liability. In the meantime, legal scholars—and corpo-
rate advertisers—can only wait and hope that guidance from the 
Supreme Court in crafting a structured legal framework for recon-
ciling publicity and commercial speech rights is “just around the 
corner.” 
                                                                                                                            
280 See Briscoe, supra note 16. 
